

DDA Registry
File Training 4

DD/A 75-1604

4 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Final Report on A Curriculum
for Analytical Training

1. Attached are comments from the Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence on the final version of the [REDACTED] Report.

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2. Also attached is a status report on OPR's Analytical Techniques Group.

1/bkf
John N. McMahon
Associate Deputy Director
for
Administration

Attachments

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Adse w/atts
- ~~1~~ - DD/A Subject w/atts
- 1 - DD/A Chrono
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ADD/A:JNMcMahon:bkf (4 Apr 75)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Final Report on a Curriculum for
Analytical Training

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1. I have reviewed the final version of the [redacted] Report and do have a few comments. Although the report takes an awful lot of time to get there, the thrust of it is generally in the right direction and I regard it as a distinct improvement over the previous draft. To the extent that is already being or will be implemented, we certainly should achieve laudable advances in making the Agency's training activities more relevant to the intelligence production function. I particularly welcome any tendency to let an analyst's home office take on much of the responsibility for training rather than centralizing it all in OTR.

2. I find a good deal of receptivity to the views expressed regarding the Career Training Program. Similarly, the thrust of the proposals regarding the Intelligence Process Course is generally along the right lines.


3. There are, of course, some points in the report which are viewed with skepticism in these quarters. I still have considerable difficulty in seeing the need or even the feasibility of having any kind of effective course in "estimates writing". I am also not in agreement with the proposals to launch general offerings in "new analytical methodologies". As you know, we have made great advances in this field, principally by keeping it an in-house activity involving those who actually use the techniques learned in their day-to-day research activities on live problems. I have

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a hard time seeing any real worth in a generalized approach that would of necessity be taught to groups of widely diverse backgrounds and interests, and varying opportunities for practical application of the skills learned.

4. The seminar approach--either area or functional--is also in the right direction. I do think that we should move rather deliberately in this area, being careful in terms of the subject of the seminar, the number of the participants, and, most particularly, the calibre of the teacher(s). We also should follow a program which allows a good number of these to be intra- or inter-directorate programs rather than OTR programs.

5. Finally, to express again some of my bureaucratic prerogatives, a few words about resources. A number of these proposals would require resource inputs from the operating Directorates. In these hard times, these inputs may be difficult so I would caution against launching any programs requiring Directorate inputs until there is full agreement between the parties. I would also remind those who see the use of contract and academic personnel as the easy way out, that this route is usually about twice as costly.



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PAUL V. WALSH
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence

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3	Mr. McMahon	4 APR 9/5	[Signature]
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Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence			3/21/75
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27 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lapham

SUBJECT: ATG Report of Activities for DDI Review Session

3. Summary of ATG experience with new techniques

A.1. In its first year, the Analytical Techniques Group chose to concentrate on relatively simple techniques which held some promise of improving political research practices. The Bayes formula, for example, is 200 years old and has been applied over the years to a variety of academic, business, and planning problems. Its application to intelligence analysis in the late 1960's by [REDACTED] and others demonstrated some utility as well as some difficulties. The Bayes method as used by ATG has proven to be a highly effective way of mobilizing expert opinion on a discrete intelligence problem. It assures a systematic review of all-source evidence by experts who normally approach the job through various specialized areas of competence. ATG experience in four Bayesian projects

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(the fifth is just starting) suggests that it is relatively easy to induce analysts accustomed to qualitative expressions of probability to shift to numerical assessments. The Bayes method also tends to move analysts more quickly from their starting assessments (either up or down) than they would without the Bayes system. This is often unsettling for the analysts, but invariably the participants later admitted that the Bayes steered them in directions which they would have taken anyway, though with a lag in time. If there are predictive values in Bayes, they are yet to be demonstrated. None of the dire events which the Bayes exercises addressed actually happened in the time period of the projects, so we do not know how early clear trends of positive events would appear in Bayes graphs. Incidentally, the various formats used in the published presentations of Bayes have attracted much favorable comment from the main customers. Some of the innovative efforts in presentation can be applied to other types of ATG and OPR production.

2. The Gurr project began as an experiment in adapting a model taken from political science theory to

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practical intelligence analysis. Early work on the project revealed that a considerable amount of adaptation was needed to produce a model which could be applied to real-world intelligence situations. The first testing phase, using a retrospective analysis of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicated that more refinement of the model was in order, but that the means of measuring frustration and aggression and the calculations for determining the type of resulting political violence looked quite promising.

The current phase of the Gurr project involves an on-going analysis of frustrations, aggressions, and potential political violence in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Fifteen country experts (five for each country) drawn from various offices and directorates of CIA fill out individually sets of worksheets in which they attribute numerical values subjectively to each of thirty-odd "actors" and a number of variables. The results of the worksheets are computer-calculated, according to the stipulations of the model, and are published in monthly progress reports. This phase of the project is about in mid-course, and

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results to date show, not surprisingly, that the potential for political violence [] is very high, and that the chances of civil war and conspiracy (coups) are rising, particularly the latter. For [] the violence potential is also very high, but dropping slightly with no clear indication yet of the type of violence likely to prevail. In many ways this phase of the project will not yield neat results. We expect to have a better appreciation by June, however, of the usefulness and the usability of the model. As with the Bayes projects, we are not yet sure of the predictive value of this method. The adapted Gurr model does, however, give strong indications of becoming a very handy descriptive analytical tool.

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3. ATG's experimental work with political games also shows considerable potential as an analytical method. The first ATG effort in this area was a simulation of the Caracas Law of the Sea conference, conducted as part of an OTR course. The ATG coordinator assigned

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country roles to class members, provided some basic factual backgrounds on national interests and ran through three sessions of simulated negotiation.

A rather different game was organized by ATG's summer intern last year. In this case two teams representing

[redacted] dealt with issues arising from the [redacted] insurgency. Team members were drawn from OPR, OCI, CRS, and the DDO. Three game sessions and a critique stretching over a two week period afforded ample time for the teams to reach an impasse. Some interesting aspects of this game as well as the two subsequent OPR games [redacted]

[redacted] were the number and variety of misperceptions, missed signals, and in some cases the inability of one team to take seriously the moves of the other team. The [redacted] requested by the NIO Assistant for Latin America, used teams members from CIA, State, DIA, and Treasury. OTR technicians furnished closed circuit television and audio equipment by which the OPR control team monitored the game sessions. General Walters participated in the game critique and showed a lively interest in the game decisions and procedures.

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A feature of all OPR games conducted so far has been the favorable verdict of the participants on the usefulness of the exercise as a training experience, and mind-stretching exercise. Again, ATG does not consider games as reliable predictive techniques. But, taken selectively, a program of political games can provide stimulating substantive aid to analysts.

4. One of the great assets of the agency is the abundance of expert knowledge. ATG believes that, in addition to Bayes, there are useful ways of exploiting expert-generated data, such as Delphi techniques. An informal experiment in the spring of 1974, in which ATG constructed a questionnaire of possible scenarios on the fate of territories, and drew responses from selected experts in the building, yielded some interesting results. In this version of Delphi the participants gave numerical or percentage values to the various scenarios, and were revisited at weekly intervals, in an effort to arrive at a consensus. (Delphi differs from Bayes in this respect.) Delphi as an intelligence technique is still largely unexplored, but



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there are circumstances in which it could serve a useful purpose. It is worth a follow-up. But, in the whole area of exploiting expert opinion, ATG recognizes the danger of overtaxing the resources. We cannot constantly impose upon the time of senior analysts in various other offices, and therefore, must be highly selective in methods used and individuals imposed upon.

5. One of the tasks of ATG is to explore unconventional ways of approaching political research, and to work in conjunction with OPR's more traditional analysts. Efforts in this area have considerable potential. For example, in support of an OPR project



 revealed through correlations on a computer matrix some relationships not apparent through traditional analysis. As a second step ATG is constructing a larger computer-based matrix of all  members matched against some 40 variables. This project, worked out in

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collaboration with CRS, will provide a permanent data base, easy to update and easy to use, for any future project [REDACTED] Experience gained in this exercise will facilitate other elite studies, such as the Iran project and several Soviet leadership studies.

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There is an abundance of data stored in university and research institute computers, and a variety of programs designed to manipulate and analyze these data. The problem is that not much of this is either directly related to intelligence problems, or is available in a usable form. ATG is investigating both the problems of better access to the data, and of adapting existing programs to OPR purposes. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] are promising analytical tools, but only after some extensive reworking.

B. There are, of course, a number of quite promising techniques which ATG has not yet explored and is not likely to tackle for some time. In some cases, e.g., decision-making processes and perceptions analysis,

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the basic research would take several man-years before any real progress could be expected. This sort of methodological research would be more suited to the Analytical Support Center. Hence, ATG has proposed a number of basic projects, and a few rather specific jobs, for the Center. Ideas and proposals have been sought from OSR and OCI. Some of these were sent to ORD directly and others have been incorporated in OPR proposals as potential agenda items for the Center.

working group on the research program is to meet in mid-March to sort out the proposals and set an agenda for the Center. OPR proposals, some of which are certain to end up on the agenda, include: Research in Perceptions Analysis (a multi-disciplinary approach, to last two years or so); National Elite Analysis (which would tackle in a more systematic way the various efforts in this direction which government and academic researchers have begun); Research on Soviet Foreign Policy Formulation (a multi-faceted exploration of both quantitative methods and structural analyses like Graham Allison's); Identification of Authorship of Articles on Policy in the Chinese

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Press (a process of sorting out style and content in important press articles in which pseudonyms are used or no authorship is given, in an effort to identify persons or factions involved). ATG is also proposing that the Center sponsor symposia on political succession in important foreign countries and on useful approaches to elite analysis.

C. On ATG's contacts with think-tanks. There were no difficulties encountered in establishing contact with the local think-tanks. From the day OPR was born, outside research institutes have eagerly sought us out. Most of these institutes contain a mixture of sound methodological research capability and sheer fraud. It was clear from the start that this was a minefield, requiring very cautious movements. Furthermore, most research outfits concentrate on one or a few methods, though they often proclaim themselves more broadly based. We found, for example, that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had little to offer that we could use at this stage. Almost continuous contacts with [REDACTED] have not revealed any areas of strong

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ADDA

I thought you would be interested in this status report on the activities of OPR's Analytical Techniques Group.

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12 March 1975
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